Do research assessment exercises raise the returns to publication quality? Evidence from the New Zealand market for academic economists by Gibson, John et al.
 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
 
 
 
Do Research Assessment Exercises  
Raise the Returns to Publication Quality?  
Evidence from the New Zealand Market for Academic Economists 
 
John Gibson,  John Tressler  and  David L. Anderson  
 
 
Department of Economics 
Working Paper in Economics 11/08 
August 2008 
 
Corresponding Author 
 
John Gibson 
Economics Department 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
NEW ZEALAND, 3240 
 
Tel: +64 (0) 7-838-4045 
Email: jkgibson@waikato.ac.nz 
Homepage: http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz 
 
John Tressler 
Economics Department 
University of Waikato 
Email: tressler@waikato.ac.nz 
 
David L. Anderson 
School of Business 
Queen’s University 
Kingston, Ontario, CANADA, K7L 3N6 
Email: dla@queensu.ac 
 
 - 2 -
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many countries have introduced research assessment exercises to help measure and raise the 
quality of research in their university sector. But there is little empirical evidence on how these 
exercises, such as the Quality Evaluation of the Performance Based Research Fund (PBRF) in 
New Zealand and the recently aborted Research Quality Framework (RQF) in Australia, affect 
the signals that researchers observe in the academic labour market. Since these assessments aim 
to raise research quality, individual academics should perceive rising returns to publication 
quality at the expense of the returns to quantity. Data we collected on the rank and publication 
records of New Zealand academic economists prior to the introduction of the PBRF and just after 
the second assessment round are used to estimate the changing returns to the quantity and quality 
of journal articles. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many countries have introduced research assessment exercises to help measure and raise the 
quality of research carried out in their university sector. These include the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) in the United Kingdom, which began in 1986, a similarly named assessment that 
began in Hong Kong in the early 1990s, and the Quality Evaluation of the Performance Based 
Research Fund (PBRF) in New Zealand, which started in 2003. Until recently abandoned, a 
similar exercise was planned for Australia, in the form of the Research Quality Framework. 
 
Although these assessments differ in their details, a common aim is to enable research funds to 
be concentrated into more research active units (Cave, Hanney and Kogan 1991). According to 
the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC), who administer the PBRF in New Zealand, the goal 
is to “reward research activities of national and international excellence” with universities 
encouraged to “aim for depth rather than breadth in their research capacity” (TEC, 2004, p. 1). In 
New Zealand, the mechanism for achieving this goal is an allocation of funds, equivalent to over 
one-fifth of total university funding, on the basis of research quality. Since most of the money in 
the PBRF was previously paid to universities on the basis of enrolments, it largely involves 
re-allocating funds between universities, which may yield some static efficiency gains. For 
example, Hazledine and Kurniawan (2005) estimate a one percent increase in research output of 
the New Zealand university sector following the PBRF re-allocation.1  
 
Since both direct costs and indirect compliance costs of research assessments are likely to exceed 
the value of extra research resulting from static efficiency gains, such assessments only make 
economic sense if they also induce dynamic efficiency gains.2 For example, Evans and Quigley 
(2006) predict that the PBRF will increase research volume and excellence due to greater 
competition between New Zealand universities, especially because the quality rating is akin to a 
tournament which should induce competitors to exert considerable effort. However, for such 
dynamic efficiency gains to be realized individual academics have to respond to the incentives 
created by research incentives and the funding allocations derived from these. 
 
Yet little is known about how research assessments change the signals that academics observe in 
the labour market and their response to these changed incentives. Studies of the RAE suggest 
that it did not induce a change in behaviour of either the research inactive or the most active 
                                                 
1  They also consider a hypothetical allocation designed to equate marginal productivity between the 
universities, which entails large reallocations of funding but still only raises research output by three 
percent. 
2  Sastry and Bekhadnia (2006) estimate that the RAE has a cost of about £100 million over seven years, 
although they point out that this may be smaller than the costs of other funding allocation mechanisms. 
In New Zealand the total compliance and administrative costs of the 2003 Quality Evaluation were 
estimated to be equivalent to between 2-14 percent of the total allocated PBRF funding for the period 
2004-2006 (WEB Research, 2004). 
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researchers. Only those academics with a moderate interest in research devoted more time to 
research and less to activities outside the assessment (Talib, 2002).  The only empirical estimates 
of the impact of research assessments on economists we are aware of are by Moore et al (2002).3 
They provide empirical estimates of the effects of the RAE on academic economists in the UK 
based on 157 curriculum vitae obtained from a survey of 1,000 economists and from websites.4 
Their results suggest that individuals in highly ranked departments increased research output in 
higher-ranked journals, while those in lower ranked departments increased research output in 
other journals. 5  They provide evidence to suggest that the productivity increase occurred 
primarily amongst individuals who were just short of the number of publications required to be 
included in the RAE, and resulted mainly from existing facility rather than from new hires. 
   
In this paper we use data collected by the authors on the rank and publication records of New 
Zealand academic economists both prior to the introduction of the PBRF and immediately after 
the second assessment round.6 Since this assessment, like others, aims to raise research quality, 
individual academics should perceive rising returns to publication quality at the expense of the 
returns to quantity. We therefore test this prediction by regressing academic rank on indicators of 
lifetime quantity and quality of journal articles published by each academic. Surprisingly, the 
results indicate that the returns to the quantity of publications exceed the returns to quality in 
both periods, and difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the relative returns to quality 
may have gone down rather than up.  
 
The PBRF is well suited for this type of study because unlike the British RAE, where the unit of 
assessment is a department or group, in the PBRF the unit of assessment is the individual 
academic. According to one New Zealand vice-chancellor, who is also an expert on industrial 
relations, the unique feature of the PBRF is that it establishes a one-to-one relationship between 
the research performance of individual academic staff and the reputation and revenue of the 
institution (Walsh, 2004). Thus the impact of the PBRF should be quickly reflected in the 
relative rewards accruing to various academic activities, including the rewards for quality versus 
quantity of publications and we test this proposition with our empirical models.  
                                                 
3  There is a substantial empirical literature on other aspects of research assessment exercises.  With 
respect to research quality, Clerides et al (2008) show that RAE rankings of departments are in close 
agreement with the profession’s view of research quality as indicated by independent department 
rankings, which in turn are based on journal rankings similar to those used in this paper.  For New 
Zealand, Smart (2008, 2005) considers the relationship between PBRF outcomes for individuals and 
variables representing personal and employment related characteristics of the researchers. 
4  The likelihood of response and inclusion of a CV on a website may be related to research performance. 
5  Moore et al. (2002) define quality journals as those in a list of 60 top journals.  Their model for highly 
ranked departments does not include publications in other journals. 
6  These data supplement some that were previously collected and used for departmental ranking 
exercises by Gibson (2000) and Anderson and Tressler (2008). 
 - 5 -
Moreover, there has been high turnover in New Zealand universities, in part due to recruitment 
efforts to improve PBRF scores. For example, in the data described below only one-half of 
academics in New Zealand university economics departments in 2007 were present in 1999. 
Thus even if the remaining vestiges of a tenure system make it difficult for universities to change 
the labour market conditions of incumbent academics, the relationship between research 
productivity and rewards for the substantial number of new entrants should reflect the changed 
incentive structure. We use this feature of the New Zealand data to provide a further test of the 
hypothesis that research assessments raise the returns to publication quality relative to quantity. 
  
In the next section we review the PBRF process and the outcomes of the 2003 and 2006 rounds, 
noting the emphasis placed on the quality of research outcomes.  The empirical model and the 
data used are introduced in Section III.  In Section IV we present our results and use these to 
show how the PBRF era influenced the academic labour market in New Zealand, concentrating 
in particular on changes in the importance of the quantity and quality of research published in 
journals.  The key conclusions of the paper are summarized in Section V. 
 
II. The Performance-Based Research Fund and the Quality Evaluation Assessments 
 
The Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) was established in 2003 and now provides over 
one-fifth of university income in New Zealand. The primary goal is for excellent research in the 
tertiary education sector to be encouraged and rewarded. Specifically, the PBRF attempts: 
• to reward and encourage the quality of researchers - 60 percent of the fund 
• to reflect research degree completions - 25 percent of the fund 
• to reflect external research income - 15 percent of the fund. 
 
Sixty percent of the PBRF allocation is based on a Quality Evaluation, which was first completed 
in 2003 with a second, partial, round in 2006. In the first evaluation, over 8000 academics 
selected a discipline (from a choice of 41) under which their research would be evaluated, and 
submitted an Evidence Portfolio to one of 12 peer review panels (including one for “Business 
and Economics”) summarizing their research activity from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2002. 
These portfolios could list up to 50 research outputs, with the four self-nominated as most 
significant identified and discussed by the researcher. 7  In addition, the portfolios provided 
indications of Peer Esteem (PE), such as awards and citations, and Contributions to the Research 
Environment (CRE), such as research student supervision. A grade for each academic was 
calculated by the panels, using a weighting of 70 percent for the research outputs, and 15 percent 
for each of the PE and CRE components. These grades of R (research inactive), C (good quality 
research), B (very good quality research), and A (world class research) were also converted into 
numeric points with values of zero (R), 2 (C), 6 (B) and 10 (A). These points were then averaged 
                                                 
7  Panellists had the option of requesting self-nominated papers from the TEC. 
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across reporting units and results for each department and university were publicized. The 
resulting rankings of universities, together with annual data on research degree completions and 
external research income provides the basis for the annual PBRF funding allocation. 
 
In the first quality evaluation the panels assigned relatively few high grades, with only 5.7 (23.2) 
percent of PBRF-eligible staff receiving an A (B) grade and almost 40 percent getting an R 
(Boston, et al, 2005). The rankings in Economics were little better, with five percent receiving an 
A grade, 31 percent receiving a B and 34 percent an R. Scores were higher in the second 
evaluation, covering the six years from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2005, although it is not 
clear if this resulted from changes in the rules,8 more generous panels, better writing of evidence 
portfolios, recruitment of more productive academics,9 or from genuine improvement in research 
performance. Across all subjects, the number getting either an A or B rose from 29 percent in 
2003 to 33 percent, while for economics, the second evaluation gave an A grade to seven percent, 
a B grade to 38 percent and the R grade to only 16 percent.  
 
The research assessment for the PBRF is meant to be a quality-orientated exercise. This is 
apparent both from the low requirement for quantity – only two-thirds of an article per year is 
needed to assemble an evidence portfolio – and from statements of various sector leaders and 
researchers. For example, according to the Minister of Tertiary Education: “[T]he PBRF furthers 
government’s aim of improving the average quality of research in the tertiary system and this 
funding increase will provide additional incentives for tertiary education organisations to strive 
for research excellence” (Mallard, 2005). The quality assessment is also likely to alter 
publication strategies. According to Boston et al (2005) the PBRF raises the risk that social 
scientists will be less inclined to pursue research of an applied nature and research with a strong 
New Zealand orientation, and that they will be less inclined to publish the results of their 
research in local journals. However these propositions about raising average quality and 
changing publication strategies have never been tested in any formal manner. 
 
III. The Empirical Model 
 
There is a substantial literature involving empirical studies of the academic labour market in 
general, and the market for academic economists specifically.10  This research has been used to 
consider the negative impact of seniority (Ransom, 1994, Moore et al, 1998, Bratsberg et al, 
                                                 
8  Two new grades were introduced for New and Emergent researchers, R(NE) and C(NE) and it was also possible 
for academics to carry forward their 2003 grade, making it only a ‘partial’ round. However, since most 
academics scored worse in 2003 than expected, a majority (two-thirds for economics) put forward new portfolios 
and were reevaluated.  
9  Of the 218 new A grades that were assigned in the 2006 Quality Evaluation (with 412 carried over from 2003), 
48 of them (22 percent) were appointments from overseas, as universities used recruitment as a device to raise 
their quality score. 
10  Coupé (2004) provides a recent review of research on the market for academic economists. 
 - 7 -
2003), the return to citations and publications (Moore et al, 2001, Hamermesh, 1989), co-
authorship (Sauer, 1988, Moore et al, 2001, Hilmer and Hilmer, 2005), comparisons of returns to 
research productivity in the U.S. and U.K. (Moore et al, 2007) and economic journal and 
department rankings Gibson (2000).   In this literature a standard approach is to estimate annual 
salaries as a function of various measures of research productivity and individual characteristics 
that might affect earnings such as experience (the number of years since receiving a PhD or 
publication of the first article if earlier), seniority (the number of years at the same institution), 
quadratic terms associated with experience and seniority, gender, rank, administrative 
responsibility and other variables.    
 
In this paper we use a model in this class to determine whether there have been changes in the 
academic labour market in the PBRF era, considering in particular whether there have been 
changes to the returns to the quantity and quality of research.  The relationship between some 
measure of the outcome in the market, income or academic rank, yj and measures of research 
quantity and quality, n1 and n2 by academic j over their career is assumed to be: 
 
,112211 jkjkjjjj uxxnny +++++= ββαα L  
 
where xi (i=1,...,k) are control variables reflecting characteristics of individual j that might affect 
market outcomes and uj is a random disturbance. 
 
Our dependent variable is academic rank (Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Associate Professor and 
Professor). This has a number of advantages compared with salary, which is the more typically 
used dependent variable. Academic rank is easily observable whereas individual salaries can 
only be obtained from surveys, which are likely to be subject to both non-response and reporting 
biases. For example, previous surveys of academic economists obtain response rates as low as 
13 percent (Moore et al, 2007) so robust inferences from such samples are unlikely. Also, Beil 
and Laband (1996) report that economists appear to understate their income when paying 
income-contingent professional memberships (to the AEA) so they also may mis-report when 
answering surveys. 
 
As noted by Boyle (2006) the New Zealand academic system involves the four principal ranks 
within which there are a number of salary steps. The salary paid to an individual within each 
rank step is determined by collective agreement negotiated annually with the academic trade 
union. These salary levels are common to all disciplines except for medicine and dentistry.  
Academics on individual contracts are usually offered a salary directly related to that negotiated 
with the union. A salary premium over and above the standard scale is only occasionally paid.  
Thus academic rank is likely to be a good proxy for salaries in New Zealand. 
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Academic rank also may be better than salary as an empirical approximation to the utility term in 
academics’ objective function. The problem with replacing the theoretical utility term with an 
(potentially) observable salary term is that academics are unlikely to be salary maximisers. The 
pecuniary returns to economists are much greater outside of academia so if it is only salary that 
academic economists were maximizing they would appear to be employed in the wrong sector. 
However, since academic rank also captures prestige and perhaps avoidance of unpleasant duties 
(e.g., teaching first year classes), it may be a more relevant dependent variable than is salary. 
 
Research output is evaluated by considering all refereed articles published in journals included in 
the EconLit database by economists in New Zealand economics departments with a rank of 
lecturer or above. While it may be desirable to have information on publications other than 
refereed journals, such as books and monographs, such data are not readily available. However, the 
bias from these omissions may not be too serious. For example, a previous study of academic 
economists in New Zealand estimated that the returns to publishing a sole-authored book were 
equivalent to those from publishing just four pages in a top journal or equivalently six pages in a 
second tier journal.11 
 
Two datasets are used. The first covers members of New Zealand economics departments as at 
April 1999 and includes their lifetime journal articles, as recorded in EconLit, published up until 
31 December, 1998.12 Although originally collected for another purpose by Gibson (2000), this 
dataset is useful for our purposes because it corresponds to a period before the announcement 
and implementation of the PBRF. The second dataset is for members of New Zealand economics 
departments as at April 2007, which is just nine months after the Census date for the second 
PBRF quality evaluation, and this dataset includes lifetime journal articles published up until 
31 December 2006.   
 
Following the usual practice we use a “share and size adjusted page” as our unit of output.  
Multi-authored papers have shares allocated to individuals using the 1/n rule, where n is the 
number of authors. We also do not distinguish whether an individual is the lead author amongst 
co-authors for papers with multiple authors. Evidence in favour of these assumptions is provided 
by Sauer (1998), Hilmer and Hilmer (2005) and several other studies. Page sizes are adjusted to 
Economic Record page equivalents using correction factors derived from Towe and Wright 
(1995) and Gibson (2000) for 171 journals. These journals include all of the journals in the top 
three tiers of the four tier ranking used by Towe and Wright (1995) and also many from the 
                                                 
11  These “top” and “second tier” journal groups had 12 and 23 members. The full list is reported by 
Gibson (2000) and is based on previous groupings made by Bairam (1996) and Towe and Wright 
(1995). 
12  The starting date for the electronic records in EconLit is 1969 and only two academics in New Zealand 
economics departments in 1999 had articles dating to that year. 
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bottom tier. The other journals for which size correction factors were not calculated are in the 
bottom tier and they are given the average size correction of bottom tier journals (0.60).  
 
Five measures of research quality are developed based on journal weighting schemes commonly 
used in the literature. Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) (MSF) develop a weighting scheme 
based on a 1993 survey of U.S. economic department chairs. Respondents were asked to rank 
journals on the basis of ‘four’ for the best to ‘zero’ for the worst. They provide weights for 157 
journals. Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) (KMS) use 1998 citation counts to rank 
143 journals. The weighting scheme used adjusts for the age and size of the journal, as well as 
self-citations and journal impact. Coupé (2003) uses a similar citation based methodology, but 
covers a broader range of 273 journals. We use Coupé’s Impact Factor weighting scheme.  
Bauwens (1998) uses citation counts and impact factors to allocate journals to four groups, with 
all other journals placed in Group 5.  The top group, Group One, is given a weight of 5 while a 
weight of 1 is given for Group Five.  The Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) website 
provides citation based rankings of 540 journals relating to five different impact factors.  We use 
the discounted and recursive impact factors.13 
 
All five weighting schemes are scaled so that the Economic Record is 1.0. The quality measures 
are the difference between the total of weighted and unweighted share and size adjusted pages. 
Thus the addition of a page published in the Economic Record would not raise an individual’s 
quality score, while if they publish in higher ranked journals their quality score increases and 
publishing in a journal ranked below the Economic Record lowers the quality score.14 
 
In addition to publication in refereed journals, academic rank is likely to depend on qualifications, 
experience, seniority, and possibly other research outputs and achievements in teaching and service. 
To obtain information on some of these factors, the university Calendars were checked to see how 
many years each economist had been with their current university, whether they held a PhD, and 
where and when that PhD was from. The quality of the PhD granting institution is measured by a 
binary variable, which equals 1 if the department was one of the top thirty contributors to one or 
more of five premier journals in economics (Bairam, 1994).15  While it might be desirable to have 
information on other outputs including teaching and service, data on these were not available.   
 
                                                 
13 Definitions and impact factors are available from http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html 
14  We initially considered using New Zealand Economic Papers (NZEP) as our numeraire since it is the 
most popular publishing outlet for New Zealand economists (Economic Record is third) but NZEP is 
not ranked in some of these journal weighting schemes so the quality-weighted pages would be zero 
given the implicit quality weight of zero for NZEP. 
15  The five journals are the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Economic Journal, the 
Journal of Political Economy, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the two datasets.  In the first year, before PBRF, there was 
a 70:30 split in academic rank, with 70 percent being either a Senior Lecturer or Lecturer and only 
30 percent being either an Associate Professor or Professor.   Eight years later, after the second  
 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Means (Standard Deviations) 
Variable     1999 2007 Description 
Dependent Variables 
Professor 0.139 0.199 Academic is a Professor (=1), otherwise =0 
Assoc. Professor 0.157 0.199 Academic is an Associate Professor (=1), otherwise=0 
Senior Lecturer 0.519 0.420 Academic is a Senior Lecturer (=1), otherwise =0 
Lecturer 0.185 0.183 Academic is a Lecturer (=1), otherwise =0 
Explanatory Variables 
Quantity 46.407 
(54.390) 
62.056 
(76.463) 
Lifetime quantity of Economic Record-sized journal 
pages published (adjusted for number of co-authors) 
Quality measures 
Bauwens 2.819 
(25.270) 
-0.455 
(27.726) 
Difference between impact-weighted (using Bauwens 
weights) lifetime pages published and Quantity 
Coupé 30.380 
(88.417) 
36.066 
(112.305) 
Difference between impact-weighted (using Coupé 
impact factor) lifetime pages published and Quantity 
KMS 69.085 
(261.613) 
45.632 
(189.830) 
Difference between impact-weighted (using KMS 
impact factors) lifetime pages published and Quantity 
MSF -20.211 
(31.478) 
-32.772 
(48.804) 
Difference between impact-weighted (with MSF 
perception based weights) lifetime pages published 
and Quantity
RePEc 84.445 
(256.780) 
102.924 
(243.885) 
Difference between impact-weighted (with RePEc 
recursive discounted weights) lifetime pages 
published and Quantity
Demographic controls 
Experience 13.917 
(7.715) 
14.817 
(9.916) 
Years since receipt of highest degree (or publication 
of first article if earlier) 
Seniority 10.287 
(7.413) 
10.344 
(8.704) 
Years of employment at current university 
PhD? 0.833 
(0.374) 
0.901 
(0.300) 
Highest degree is PhD
Ranked PhD? 0.361 
(0.483) 
0.313 
(0.465) 
PhD is from a department in top 30 contributors to 
one or more of the leading five journals (from Bairam, 
1994)
Male 0.861 
(0.347) 
0.779 
(0.417) 
Person is male (=1) or female (=0) 
In Previous Data? ... 0.496 
(0.502) 
Person was in the 1999 dataset (=1) 
Observations 108 131 
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PBRF assessment, there was a 60:40 split as the number of Associate Professors and Professors 
increased and the number of Senior Lecturers decreased. The average quantity of research output, 
as measured by share-and-size-adjusted-pages was one-third higher in 2007 while average quality 
was somewhat lower using three of the quality measures and higher using two (Coupé and RePEc 
weights). Despite the change in academic ranks, the demographic structure was largely the same in 
terms of experience (13.9 versus 14.8 years), seniority (10.3 years in both periods), gender (86 
percent male versus 78 percent male) and whether holding a PhD (83 percent versus 90 percent) 
and whether that PhD was from a ranked department (36 percent versus 31 percent). This stability 
in demographic characteristics occurred despite high turnover, with slightly less than one-half of 
the academics in 2007 also present in New Zealand economics departments in 1999. 
 
The estimation is carried out using ordered logit models where the probability of observing 
outcome i (e.g., holding Professorial rank) corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear 
score function, plus random error, uj is within the range of cut points established for the outcome:  
 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ≤++++++<== ∑
=
− ij
m
mkjkjjjij uxxnni κδββαακ
8
1
1122111ProutcomePr L  
 
where the α and β coefficients are estimated together with the cut points, κ1, κ2, and κ3.16 These cut 
points give the required value of the score function needed to move from one academic rank to the 
next. There are also a set of fixed effects δm included, for the (m=8) universities since academic 
rank may also be influenced by the characteristics of the employing institution. For example, some 
institutions may have to offer applicants a higher academic rank to compensate for some 
drawbacks of the working environment.   
 
IV. Results  
 
Table 2 contains the ordered logit results for the determinants of academic rank in New Zealand 
economics departments in 1999, prior to the implementation of the PBRF. There are five sets of 
estimates, alternately using the Bauwens, Coupé, KMS, MSF and RePEc weights for journals 
when constructing the measure of lifetime publication Quality. However, the patterns amongst 
the coefficient estimates are similar with all five sets of weights. 
 
The probability of holding higher academic rank rises with increases in both the quantity and 
quality of publications.17 Since the coefficients are not directly interpretable a set of marginal 
                                                 
16  An ordered probit model was also used and gave similar results. Ordered logit assumes that uj is logistically 
distributed while ordered probit assumes that it is normally distributed. 
17  Although the coefficient for quality is not significant for RePEc weights, perhaps because these weights reflect 
journal rankings from 2008 whereas the other weighting schemes we use are derived for periods closer to 1999. 
 - 12 -
effects for one standard deviation increases in either quantity or quality are calculated and 
reported along with their bootstrapped standard errors in Table 3. There are four of these 
marginal effects for each of these ordered logit regressions, since the dependent variable has four 
outcomes. For example, according to the ordered logit regression when the quality measure uses  
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Academic Rank: New Zealand Economists, 1999 
 Weighting Scheme for Journal Impact Factors 
 Bauwens Coupé KMS MSF RePEc 
Quantity 0.036 0.026 0.027 0.057 0.023 
 (5.24)** (4.32)** (3.71)** (4.02)** (3.64)** 
Quality 0.063 0.015 0.005 0.058 0.003 
 (3.88)** (2.82)** (2.75)** (3.36)** (1.48) 
Experience 0.563 0.513 0.512 0.581 0.534 
 (3.66)** (3.34)** (3.36)** (3.62)** (3.64)** 
Experience squared -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 
 (2.21)* (1.55) (1.49) (2.15)* (1.60) 
Seniority 0.080 0.024 0.015 0.058 -0.002 
 (1.08) (0.23) (0.16) (0.68) (0.02) 
PhD? 3.133 2.672 2.935 3.268 2.901 
 (3.17)** (3.05)** (3.40)** (3.51)** (3.41)** 
Ranked PhD? -1.526 -1.275 -0.814 -1.140 -0.798 
 (1.74)+ (1.56) (1.10) (1.41) (1.07) 
Male 0.934 0.649 0.088 0.153 0.095 
 (1.44) (1.15) (0.15) (0.26) (0.16) 
Fixed Effects      
Canterbury -1.786 -1.726 -1.296 -1.311 -1.044 
 (1.88)+ (1.57) (1.30) (1.27) (1.06) 
Lincoln 1.898 1.801 2.208 1.793 1.919 
 (2.28)* (2.25)* (2.61)** (2.00)* (2.40)* 
Massey 0.285 0.539 0.780 0.730 0.675 
 (0.26) (0.50) (0.69) (0.68) (0.61) 
Otago -0.322 0.106 0.562 0.220 0.401 
 (0.41) (0.14) (0.65) (0.22) (0.49) 
Victoria 0.068 0.303 0.925 0.678 0.900 
 (0.09) (0.43) (1.27) (0.86) (1.25) 
Waikato -0.058 0.344 0.736 0.010 0.654 
 (0.05) (0.36) (0.83) (0.01) (0.77) 
Cut Points      
  Senior Lecturer 7.098 6.085 6.429 6.914 6.282 
  Associate Professor 13.040 11.557 11.700 12.320 11.372 
  Professor 15.325 13.693 13.801 14.596 13.418 
Pseudo-R2 0.505 0.470 0.456 0.479 0.441 
Zero-slopes χ2 test 80.40** 85.68** 71.27** 68.78** 69.21** 
Note: Robust t-statistics in ( ), with statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by +, *, **. N=108. 
The excluded dummy category is a female without a PhD at Auckland. The cut-points give the value that needs to 
be exceeded by the linear index (plus random error) to allocate the jth person to a particular academic rank. 
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Bauwens weights, a standard deviation increase in the quantity of (share-and-size-adjusted) 
journal pages reduces the probability of being a Lecturer (Senior Lecturer) by an average of 9.5 
(7.7) percentage points while increasing the probability of being a (Associate) Professor by (3.8) 
13.4 percentage points. In comparison, the responses to the standard deviation increase in quality 
are always slightly smaller in absolute value, at -8.0 (-5.8) percentage points for being a Lecturer 
(Senior Lecturer) and (3.1) 10.6 percentage points for being a (Associate) Professor. 
 
 
Table 3: Marginal Effects for Quantity and Quality, 1999 
      Quantity       Quality  Abs. difference 
(Quant – Qual) 
Std 
error XP ΔΔ  std error XP ΔΔ std error  
Prob of being a: Bauwens weights 
Lecturer -0.095 0.025  -0.080 0.026  0.015 0.019
Senior Lecturer -0.077 0.044  -0.058 0.041  0.019 0.027
Assoc. Professor 0.038 0.035  0.031 0.030  0.007 0.014
Professor 0.134 0.038  0.106 0.042  0.027 0.034
         
Prob of being a: Coupé weights 
Lecturer -0.079 0.025  -0.075 0.026  0.003 0.025
Senior Lecturer -0.054 0.032  -0.050 0.033  0.004 0.032
Assoc. Professor 0.036 0.032  0.034 0.028  0.002 0.016
Professor 0.097 0.025  0.091 0.037  0.006 0.042
         
Prob of being a: KMS weights 
Lecturer -0.082 0.023  -0.072 0.027  0.010 0.026
Senior Lecturer -0.059 0.041  -0.047 0.053  0.012 0.035
Assoc. Professor 0.037 0.027  0.032 0.028  0.005 0.016
Professor 0.104 0.035  0.087 0.051  0.017 0.045
         
Prob of being a: MSF weights 
Lecturer -0.141 0.032  -0.095 0.027  0.045 0.018
Senior Lecturer -0.169 0.073  -0.075 0.046  0.094 0.042
Assoc. Professor 0.074 0.042  0.048 0.030  0.026 0.025
Professor 0.236 0.072  0.122 0.046  0.113 0.046
     
Prob of being a: RePEc weights 
Lecturer -0.075 0.022  -0.051 0.027  0.024 0.032
Senior Lecturer -0.050 0.032  -0.025 0.040  0.023 0.036
Assoc. Professor 0.035 0.022  0.021 0.023  0.011 0.019
Professor 0.091 0.031  0.056 0.047  0.035 0.049
Notes: 
The marginal effects, ,XP ∂∂ are the change in the predicted probabilities following a one standard deviation 
increase in either Quantity or Quality, with all other variables held at their original position and using the 
coefficients in Table 2 to generate the predictions. The reported values are averaged over all observations. 
The standard errors are calculated from 100 bootstrap replications. 
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The pattern of slightly larger marginal effects for increases in quantity than for increases in 
quality holds regardless of the set of journal weights that are used. However, for the Bauwens, 
Coupé, KMS and RePEc weights, not only are the differences in the marginal effects for quality 
and quantity usually small, with absolute values averaging 1.4 percentage points, they are also 
not statistically significant. But when the MSF weights are used the difference is more 
substantial with marginal effects for quantity 11.3 percentage points more than marginal effects 
for quality at the Professorial level. Moreover, for three of the four levels of academic rank 
(Associate Professor is the exception) the difference is statistically significant. Thus it appears 
that prior to the PBRF and its quality evaluation exercises the New Zealand labour market for 
academic economists may have rewarded quantity by slightly more than it rewarded quality, 
although the hypothesis of equal returns cannot be rejected when using most sets of quality 
weights. 
 
Before turning to how the returns to quality and quantity had changed by 2007 it is worth 
considering the results for the other variables.  According to Table 2, the probability of holding 
higher academic rank in 1999 rose with years of experience but at a declining rate.  Seniority in 
terms of the number of years employed at the current university had no significant effect once 
experience is controlled for.  There was a large effect of holding a PhD, with the magnitude of 
the coefficient on this single variable being about one half of that needed to move either from 
Lecturer to Senior Lecturer or from Senior Lecturer to Associate Professor.  There is weak 
evidence to suggest that economists with PhDs from more highly ranked departments were less 
likely to hold higher academic rank and there was no significant effect of gender.  Amongst the 
fixed effects the only significant variables are for Lincoln University, where academic rank was 
higher than would be predicted by the other variables and the University of Canterbury where it 
was lower (but the effect is statistically significant only with the Bauwens weights). 
 
Table 4 contains the ordered logit results for the determinants of academic rank in New Zealand 
economics departments in 2007, just after the second PBRF Quality Evaluation. While the 
pattern of results is generally similar to those for 1999 in Table 2 there are several key 
differences. First, the coefficients on the quality variable are smaller, regardless of the weighting 
scheme used, and for Coupé, KMS and MSF weights they are less statistically significant (falling 
from significant at the one percent level to the ten percent level when using the KMS weights 
and from one percent to the five percent level when using the Coupé and MSF weights).18 
Second, there is now a negative return to seniority, which is statistically significant at the five 
percent level in four of the five regressions; this finding is consistent with Ransom (1994) who 
explains it in terms of the monoposony power of universities that enables lower salaries to be 
paid to less mobile academics.  As Bratsberg et al (2003) note, negative returns could also be the  
                                                 
18  For RePEc weights quality becomes significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Academic Rank: New Zealand Economists, 2007 
 Weighting Scheme for Journal Impact Factors 
 Bauwens Coupé KMS MSF RePEc 
Quantity 0.033 0.023 0.025 0.044 0.023 
 (6.33)** (4.82)** (4.09)** (3.51)** (3.90)** 
Quality 0.045 0.008 0.003 0.030 0.002 
 (3.60)** (2.43)* (1.90)+ (2.21)* (1.98)* 
Experience 0.335 0.372 0.380 0.377 0.379 
 (3.43)** (4.11)** (4.34)** (4.16)** (4.21)** 
Experience squared -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (1.69)+ (1.91)+ (2.06)* (2.02)* (1.94)+ 
Seniority -0.084 -0.109 -0.115 -0.112 -0.113 
 (1.62) (2.21)* (2.38)* (2.22)* (2.23)* 
PhD? 1.722 1.804 1.840 1.738 1.841 
 (2.01)* (2.16)* (2.19)* (2.06)* (2.17)* 
Ranked PhD? -0.838 -0.646 -0.760 -0.495 -0.624 
 (1.21) (0.85) (1.03) (0.75) (0.90) 
Male 0.759 0.746 0.730 0.686 0.723 
 (1.68)+ (1.68)+ (1.64) (1.53) (1.62) 
Fixed Effects      
AUT 2.134 1.885 1.905 2.010 1.952 
 (2.17)* (2.18)* (2.32)* (2.12)* (2.38)* 
Canterbury -0.714 -0.878 -0.663 -0.604 -0.746 
 (0.90) (1.02) (0.78) (0.74) (0.85) 
Lincoln 0.981 0.741 0.763 1.035 0.810 
 (0.98) (0.77) (0.80) (0.98) (0.84) 
Massey 1.185 1.043 1.002 1.129 1.022 
 (1.59) (1.36) (1.22) (1.44) (1.28) 
Otago -0.855 -0.825 -0.763 -0.837 -0.695 
 (0.97) (0.95) (0.86) (0.97) (0.78) 
Victoria -1.364 -1.353 -0.868 -0.984 -0.976 
 (2.13)* (2.11)* (1.40) (1.59) (1.60) 
Waikato 0.495 0.377 0.474 0.511 0.464 
 (0.57) (0.44) (0.57) (0.58) (0.56) 
Cut Points      
  Senior Lecturer 3.195 3.236 3.360 3.282 3.382 
  Associate Professor 7.284 7.187 7.305 7.205 7.314 
  Professor 9.686 9.509 9.527 9.494 9.554 
Pseudo-R2 0.449 0.429 0.416 0.422 0.417 
Zero-slopes χ2 test 120.71** 102.38** 76.51** 77.53** 81.06** 
Note: Robust t-statistics in ( ), with statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by +, *, **. N=131. 
The excluded dummy category is a female without a PhD at Auckland. The cut-points give the value that needs to 
be exceeded by the linear index (plus random error) to allocate the jth person to a particular academic rank. 
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result of “raiding” as high-quality faculty are bid away.19  Thus the increased significance of a 
negative return to seniority could be the result of the impact of PBRF on faculty turnover.  Third, 
the premium for being male becomes (weakly) statistically significant in two of the regressions. 
Finally, the pattern of fixed effects has changed with the only university where academic rank 
was (statistically significantly) higher than would be predicted by the other variables being the 
new entrant, AUT, and Victoria being the only one where it was significantly lower (in two of 
the five specifications).20 The shifting nature of these fixed effects suggests that it is not possible 
for individual departments in New Zealand to deviate in the long run from average norms for the 
productivity level of particular academic ranks, since migration of academics to better rewarded 
departments should erode any premia.  
 
The marginal effects for quality and quantity in 2007 are reported in Table 5. In comparison with 
the results in Table 3, the marginal effects for quantity are larger (in absolute terms) than the 
corresponding values in 1999 for 19 of the 20 combinations (the exception is for the probability 
of being an Association Professor when using the MSF weights). In contrast, for 16 of the 20 
combinations, the marginal effects for quality are smaller (in absolute terms) in 2007 than in 
1999. Across all sets of weights and levels of academic rank, the gap between the marginal 
effects for quantity and those for quality in 2007 average 7.5 percentage points, compared with 
an average gap of 2.5 percentage points in 1999. Furthermore, 11 of the 20 differences in 
marginal effects for quantity and quality in Table 5 are statistically significant whereas only three 
of 20 were in Table 3, further suggesting that there were significantly higher returns to the 
quantity than to quality of research in 2007, whereas such a gap was less apparent in 1999.  
 
The differing returns to quality and quantity in 2007 are especially apparent at the Professorial 
level. Using either the Bauwens, KMS, MSF or RePEc weights, a standard deviation increase in 
the total number of pages published raises the probability of being a Professor by at least 10 
percentage points more than a similarly sized increase in the quality of publications, averaged 
over all academics in New Zealand university economics departments. Using the MSF weights, 
the gap in marginal effects is twenty percentage points (with a standard error of six percentage 
points). 
 
Corroborating evidence that there has been a rise in the returns to quantity but not to quality 
comes from comparing the determinants of academic rank for “incumbent” and “new” faculty in 
New Zealand economics departments. The logic of this comparison is that while it may be hard 
                                                 
19  Moore et al (1998) argue that the estimated negative returns may be the result of a failure to control for the 
quality of faculty research.  In contrast Bratsberg et al (2003) argue that a failure to control for the positive 
impact of matching is likely to cause the negative impact of seniority to be underestimated. 
20  The statistically negative fixed effects for Victoria persist even if observations from AUT are dropped from the 
estimation sample. 
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for universities to change the labour market conditions of incumbents (unproductive Professors 
are not demoted to Senior Lecturer), the relationship between research productivity and rewards 
for new entrants should better reflect contemporary changes in incentive structure. One-half 
(65/131) of the academic economists in 2007 were not faculty in New Zealand economics 
departments in 1999 so the ordered logits for 2007 are augmented with an interaction term for 
these “new” faculty. Although these new faculty have less experience than the incumbents 
(Table 6, column 1), only one-third were Lecturers, and almost one-quarter were Associate 
Professors or Professors since there was a lot of recruitment at senior levels in the PBRF era. 
 
Table 5: Marginal Effects for Quantity and Quality, 2007 
      Quantity       Quality  Abs. difference 
(Quant – Qual) 
Std 
error  XP ΔΔ  std error XP ΔΔ std error  
Prob of being a: Bauwens weights 
Lecturer -0.136 0.036  -0.081 0.030  0.055 0.027
Senior Lecturer -0.141 0.059  -0.051 0.041  0.090 0.045
Assoc. Professor 0.072 0.043  0.044 0.030  0.028 0.030
Professor 0.205 0.053  0.089 0.038  0.116 0.048
         
Prob of being a: Coupé weights 
Lecturer -0.109 0.035  -0.063 0.030  0.046 0.039
Senior Lecturer -0.086 0.042  -0.033 0.036  0.053 0.050
Assoc. Professor 0.056 0.034  0.031 0.024  0.025 0.032
Professor 0.139 0.045  0.064 0.040  0.075 0.060
         
Prob of being a: KMS weights 
Lecturer -0.118 0.033  -0.038 0.025  0.079 0.038
Senior Lecturer -0.096 0.044  -0.016 0.018  0.080 0.043
Assoc. Professor 0.052 0.032  0.016 0.015  0.035 0.032
Professor 0.162 0.048  0.038 0.026  0.125 0.052
         
Prob of being a: MSF weights 
Lecturer -0.162 0.036  -0.098 0.039  0.063 0.035
Senior Lecturer -0.212 0.084  -0.068 0.060  0.144 0.051
Assoc. Professor 0.060 0.047  0.050 0.034  0.011 0.046
Professor 0.314 0.103  0.117 0.069  0.197 0.060
     
Prob of being a: RePEc weights 
Lecturer -0.110 0.034  -0.039 0.029  0.070 0.042
Senior Lecturer -0.085 0.042  -0.016 0.024  0.068 0.045
Assoc. Professor 0.050 0.030  0.017 0.020  0.033 0.033
Professor 0.144 0.046  0.038 0.029  0.106 0.057
Notes: 
The marginal effects, ,XP ∂∂ are the change in the predicted probabilities following a one standard deviation 
increase in either Quantity or Quality, with all other variables held at their original position and using the 
coefficients in Table 4 to generate the predictions. The reported values are averaged over all observations. 
The standard errors are calculated from 100 bootstrap replications. 
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The results reported in Table 6 show that a considerable premium for quantity but not quality 
accrued to academics that were relatively new arrivals to New Zealand university economics 
departments in 2007.  Using all five weighting schemes, the (Quantity × New) interaction term is  
 
 
Table 6: Differences Between Incumbent and New Faculty in the Determinants of  
Academic Rank: New Zealand Economists, 2007 
 Means 
Incumbent 
(New) 
Weighting Scheme for Journal Impact Factors 
 Bauwens Coupé KMS MSF RePEc 
New (not in 1999 data) 0.496 -1.485 -1.222 -0.931 -1.014 -0.632 
  (0.55) (0.46) (0.35) (0.38) (0.24) 
Quantity 80.817 0.028 0.017 0.018 0.038 0.016 
 (43.413) (4.10)** (3.42)** (3.37)** (3.21)** (3.10)** 
Quantity × New  0.039 0.040 0.051 0.059 0.041 
  (2.12)* (2.28)* (3.02)** (2.11)* (2.43)* 
Quality 46.948 0.052 0.010 0.003 0.035 0.002 
 (44.296) (3.23)** (2.32)* (1.59) (2.19)* (1.44) 
Quality × New  -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.018 0.000 
  (0.02) (0.00) (0.95) (0.56) (0.09) 
Experience 21.939 0.051 0.118 0.091 0.063 0.130 
 (7.585) (0.24) (0.59) (0.45) (0.31) (0.66) 
Experience × New  0.320 0.265 0.185 0.285 0.230 
  (1.03) (0.88) (0.60) (0.93) (0.77) 
Experience squared 538.697 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (92.108) (0.48) (0.28) (0.44) (0.48) (0.26) 
Exper squared × New  -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
  (1.35) (1.19) (0.93) (1.05) (1.05) 
Seniority 16.893 -0.092 -0.121 -0.107 -0.084 -0.115 
 (3.692) (1.65)+ (2.28)* (2.00)* (1.49) (2.16)* 
Seniority × New  -0.007 0.014 0.114 -0.039 0.008 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.60) (0.21) (0.04) 
PhD? 0.864 3.488 3.499 3.639 3.477 3.569 
 (0.938) (3.17)** (3.26)** (3.37)** (3.26)** (3.38)** 
PhD? × New  -3.363 -3.359 -3.675 -3.529 -3.575 
  (2.09)* (2.12)* (2.33)* (2.23)* (2.28)* 
Ranked PhD? 0.318 -2.212 -1.854 -1.590 -1.446 -1.671 
 (0.308) (2.67)** (2.28)* (1.88)+ (1.90)+ (1.91)+ 
Ranked PhD? × New  2.076 1.777 1.047 1.296 1.531 
  (1.81)+ (1.58) (0.88) (1.20) (1.34) 
Male 0.848 1.590 1.396 1.301 1.245 1.316 
 (0.708) (1.89)+ (1.71)+ (1.59) (1.51) (1.62) 
Male × New  -1.384 -1.087 -1.203 -1.133 -1.062 
  (1.25) (1.01) (1.11) (1.05) (1.00) 
Pseudo-R2  0.500 0.477 0.473 0.479 0.466 
Zero-slopes χ2 test  172.84** 164.48** 163.35** 165.32** 160.72** 
Note: Models also include fixed effects for each university, which are not reported. The means for incumbent and 
new faculty reported in the Quality row are using the KMS weights. 
Other notes see Table 4. 
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statistically significant and large, compared with the quantity term for the incumbents. Thus, a 
share-and-size adjusted page published by new entrants to New Zealand university economics 
departments increases the linear score function determining academic rank by much more than 
does the same page for incumbents. In contrast, the (Quality × New) interaction is always close 
to zero and is statistically insignificant, indicating no quality premium accruing to the new 
entrants.  In terms of marginal effects, the difference-in-differences:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
INCUMBENTQUALQUANNEWQUALQUAN
XPXPXPXP ΔΔ−ΔΔ−ΔΔ−ΔΔ  
 
average 14.3 percentage points across all four academic ranks and all five weighting schemes.21 
Of the differences-in-differences, seven of the 20 show a significant rise in the returns to quantity 
relative to quality and none indicate the reverse.  To the extent that the relationship between 
productivity and academic rank for new entrants better reflects current incentive structures than 
does the relationship for incumbents, it appears that contrary to the professed aims of the PBRF 
there has been an increased reward for quantity but not for quality amongst academic economists 
in New Zealand. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Research assessment exercises like the Quality Evaluation for New Zealand’s Performance 
Based Research Fund typically aim to increase the quality of research in the university sector.  
Such exercises can also be expected to impact on the operation of the academic labour market 
and the signals that researchers observe.  If research exercises are successful in increasing the 
quality of research we would expect this to be indicated by an increase in the importance of 
quality in determining academic salaries or rank.   
 
 In this paper we have provided empirical estimates of the impact of the PBRF research 
assessment exercise on the academic labour market using data on the rank and publication 
records of all New Zealand academic economists employed by economics departments both prior 
to the introduction of PBRF and immediately after the second assessment round in 2006.  
Contrary to expectations, our results suggest that the introduction of the PBRF process has 
decreased the importance of quality and increased the importance of quantity in determining the 
academic rank of New Zealand economists.   Amongst the other estimated changes in the New 
Zealand market is an increase in the statistical significance of a negative return to seniority, 
possibly associated with increased turnover of economists. 
 
                                                 
21  To save space these marginal effects estimates and standard errors calculated from correlated bootstrap 
replications are not reported but can be obtained from the authors. 
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Given publication lags and the multi-product nature of the assessment (i.e., including the peer 
esteem and contribution to research environment components), a short run maximizing response 
by both individual academics and their universities might have been to improve these other 
components rather than publication quality.  Thus it is possible that in the next assessment in 
2012 a bigger publication quality response might be observed.  However, if it is costly to raise 
publication quality (e.g., AER rejections rates are 91%), and given that there are relatively weak 
financial returns from an A versus either a B or a C rating, the rational response from universities 
might have been to assist staff in ‘dressing-up’ portfolios without fundamental change to 
research behavior. 
 
If a decrease in the importance of quality and increase in quantity found in this paper is 
representative of the impact of the PBRF for other disciplines and for other research assessment 
exercises, then this throws further doubt on the likelihood that static or dynamic gains could 
outweigh the direct and indirect costs of such assessments. Since our methodology does not rely 
on specialized surveys, and instead uses an electronic bibliography, EconLit that is agreed upon 
as a measure of most research within the discipline, it would be possible for future studies to 
follow our approach both for other disciplines in New Zealand and for economists in other 
countries. Firmer conclusions might then be drawn about whether research assessment exercises 
actually do raise returns to quality in academic labour markets.  
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